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Latin America spends large amounts of resources on social services, yet its life expectancy and
education levels are low compared to other regions with similar levels of income.  A key reason is
the inherent difficulty of making social services produce efficiently in reponse to demands and
needs.  
This article shows how improving the organization of these service systems can make a significant
difference in health conditions and student learning. A general framework applying the lessons of
theories of the firm to the particularities of social services is developed, followed by a summary of
case studies which assessed the impact of organization on performance in education (in Brazil,
Venezuela and Chile), and in health (in Uruguay, Chile and the Dominican Republic). 
The paper shows that the relationships and rules followed by governments, service providers, and
consumers can mean the difference between success and failure. It also describes a wealth of
approaches, some of them with long histories, that point toward better ways of organizing social
services and ultimately improving health and education in the region.Acknowledgments
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Health and education systems in Latin America have made dramatic strides in increasing literacy and
reducing mortality and morbidity over the last thirty years.  Nevertheless, the region expends large
amounts of resources in these services, occupies a large share of its skilled human resources, and fails
to perform as would be expected given its level of income.   The diagnoses of inefficiency and inequity
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are ubiquitous; and the recommendations are generally quite clear: the systems need to be open to
innovation (pedagogical and medical), to provide sufficient complementary inputs and maintain facilities.
In the case of education, teachers need to have better formal and in-service training, better working
conditions, and adequate leadership and support.  In health, care needs to be shifted toward preventive
medicine and access needs to be increased.
Knowing all this, however, fails to explain why the region systematically  lacks in-service training, books
or maintenance .  Attributing these failures to weak bureaucracies or political interference are facile
explanations that confuse symptoms with causes.  Instead, analysis of the organization of social service
systems in terms of the delegation of functions and the system’s mechanisms for coordinating individual
decisions can lead to practical recommendations that address fundamental flaws.  Such
recommendations can have an impact in the short run, by reorienting the incentives that motivate
service providers, consumers, and policymakers.  They can also affect the long run by establishing
dynamics that strengthen groups and individuals with the greatest interest in positive performance.
The essays in this book grew out of a recognition of these issues as they have come to be debated in
Latin America, and they seek to apply a framework that is relatively new to the fields of education and
health in Latin America. This first chapter proposes a method of analysis that relies upon theories of
the firm and of  agency.  In the subsequent chapters, the authors have chosen at least two education or
health systems to compare within a particular country.  The comparisons demonstrate the ways that
differences in organization affect performance.  As a result of these studies, the book argues that the
way health and education systems are organized in Latin America creates incentives and accountability
mechanisms that can explain their differing impact on education and health conditions.  
Missteps Along the Way
The assembly line in factory production has long been the classic example of how organization can
affect performance: from Adam Smith’s rendering of the division of labor in a pin-making shop,
through the Ford assembly plants of the early 20  century.  However, another classic story has emerged
th
in explaining how General Motors surpassed Ford in mid-century.   Whereas the Ford motor company
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continued to produce homogeneous products within a highly hierarchical management structure,
General Motors experimented with creating different divisions  that could design different cars, interact
with other divisions horizontally for a wide range of activities, and be compared one to another
regarding their performance.  This innovation in organization helped General Motors solve several
problems simultaneously.  Not only was it easier to monitor the performance of smaller production
groups with independent output measures, but it became possible to attribute performance to the2
division’s effort by comparing it to other divisions (since all the divisions were equally influenced by
outside factors not “visible” to higher management).  Secondly, the new organization forced divisions
to face clear incentives regarding the timing and use of inputs.  Third, the divisions had greater flexibility
and could take advantage of their decentralized information to make adjustments to the mix of inputs,
and the allocation of resources among different functions.  Finally, the divisions themselves had a direct
interest to innovate, seeking new market niches, developing new products and new features, finding
more cost-effective materials, and improving internal efficiency. Thus, General Motors was better able
to respond to changing markets, reward innovation, and use decentralized information more effectively.
The education and health systems which emerged in Latin America in the middle of this century can be
compared to the Ford model of service production.  The aim was to create a homogeneous service for
all citizens.  And although an assembly line was the farthest thing from a model for education and health,
the administrative structure  to direct and manage these social services followed a similar logic: the
central management planned the provision of services, it allocated resources, distributed inputs, and gave
directives as to how the services were to be provided.  
The education and health systems did, however, differ in two very important ways.  First, their services
were given away for free.  This left them with no competitive pressures to fight for clients, and no
incentives to adapt or expand their output.  Second, the public systems were so dominant in their
sectors that they had monopsony power in the employment of teachers, doctors, nurses and other
specialized personnel.  Once employees unionized to confront this monopsony power, the resulting
bilateral negotiations rigidified and restricted employment management practices.  Furthermore, the
package of pay and benefits was modified to respond to budgetary and administrative requirements,
often keeping pay low but providing generous “off budget” benefits such as pensions and early
retirement.  This distortion in the payment package made it difficult to respond to changes in the labor
market, as well as to attract and motivate high employee performance.   Guaranteed public financing
in these systems meant that the providers did not have to market their services, which insulated them
from consumers.  Meanwhile the rigid employment contracts insulated providers from external
accountability to the government.
The limitations of this model in Latin America have been explored and debated in numerous studies.
However, the recommendations emerging from these debates have revolved around two incomplete
and generally misleading concepts: Decentralization and Privatization.  
With rising dissatisfaction from centralized service systems, it was perhaps natural that the opposite
would be considered an avenue for improvement.  Theoretical support for decentralization came from
a literature which noted that public services can be provided more effectively when they are organized
to serve groups with relatively homogeneous preferences.  Research emphasized  the lower costs of
collecting and processing information for smaller areas or organizations.  Further support came from
recognizing that local public officials can be more accountable for decisions affecting local conditions
than national officials who respond to a wider constituency.  The potential gains from decentralized
distribution of management, decision-making, and accountability were apparent.  
However, equally strong critiques have been made of decentralization because it poses problems related
to economies of scale, scope, equity, and the persistence of political manipulation at different levels.
First, the units of service production have to be large enough to capture certain scale economies.  For3
example, it is not clear that most municipalities are in any position to run a health insurance scheme
because that generally requires covering at least 100,000 people to be economically efficient.  Second,
the literature recognizes that services should be organized in large enough units to internalize
externalities.  Management of sewerage systems, for example, has to be organized in a way that addresses
the impact of effluents  from one community on another.  Third, decentralized systems have the
potential to be inequitable.  Redistribution from one community to another is more difficult when
financing and provision of services is self-contained within financially homogeneous communities.
Finally, the advantages of local accountability may be offset by opportunities for local corruption.  Local
accountability clearly depends upon the strength of political process and the distribution of power within
a particular area.  Decentralization does not necessarily resolve such problems.
Even if decentralization may be an appropriate response to the problems of providing social services,
the actual implementation of decentralization in the last decade has had its share of problems.  In many
countries, decentralization as a political program has often been used to hide a continuance of
centralized administration behind a  screen of decentralized organizational charts.  In some cases, the
policy of decentralization has resulted in the creation of new administrative regions, justifying employing
more bureaucratic staff.  Furthermore, where decentralization has actually occurred, it has been
unbalanced in the sense that functions or resources are delegated to lower levels of government without
a fully articulated system to support, coordinate and moderate the actions of these many agents.  Many
articles  have discussed the problems of decentralization in its “pure” form and the kinds of
arrangements and assignments of functions that would best address the goals of public policy.  But the
policy debate, which has been fairly simplistic, has now responded with discussions of the need for
“recentralization” — a particularly puzzling term since the focus ought to be on what functions are best
discharged by whom, rather than letting the pendulum swing once more.  Policy analysis and debate
needs a fuller appreciation of what makes a social service system function than the decentralization
debate has been able to offer.
The other dichotomy that has clouded debate over the last decade has been the privatization of social
services.  Again, in seeking a new approach, the contrast with  public systems led people to the private
sector for solutions.  This was also motivated by a recognition of certain gains from the private sector:
incentives to reduce costs, increase output, and induce innovation.  Private provision of services is
expected to reduce costs because it places an agent, the owner or owners, in a direct position to profit
when they can provide the service at a lower cost.  This is in direct contrast to public services where any
innovation that reduces costs reduces pressure on a government agency budget, i.e. no one in particular
gets a large benefit.  Private provision also holds the promise for expanding output of services because,
again, the owners profit any time they can provide services to another person for whom the marginal
payment exceeds the marginal cost of provision.  By contrast, public managers do not necessarily receive
extra budget  for serving more clients, and certainly do not benefit in terms of their personal
remuneration.  A third advantage claimed for the private sector, when it operates competitively, is that
it fosters innovation.  Public bureaucracies find it difficult to take risks on new ways of providing
services.  When they do take risks and make major changes, failures have country-wide implications.
Small private firms, however, can take risks that generate information and new technology without
jeopardizing the system as a whole.
When using their broadest brushes, the advocates of privatizing services paint a picture that fails  to
recognize its limitations.  First, private firms respond directly to effective demand not to broadly stated4There are, of course, many studies that give more nuanced perspectives than the ones described here.  Consider, for example, Van
der Gaag (1995) and Zuckerman and de Kadt (1997).
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social or community goals.  Therefore, privatizing services would still, in the case of social services, entail
public involvement in financing and subsidizing such services.  Second, market efficiency requires that
consumers  be well-informed and can exercise their option among providers.  But the quality of different
education and health providers is not necessarily apparent and switching from one service to another
may be costly.  Third, the risk of private providers failing for financial reasons is more problematic for
social services than normal consumer products because of long term commitments in education or
insurance commitments in health.  
The debates and analyses surrounding privatization have also been misleading and incomplete.  They
have been misleading because they focus on private or public ownership as the critical factor when in
fact many public systems also have competitive pressures and efficient incentives.  In other words, many
of the advantages ascribed to private provision do not necessarily require private ownership.  General
Motors solved many of the problems faced by public service systems related to imperfect monitoring,
weak incentives, and little innovation by creating “internal” markets between its divisions, while retaining
full ownership.  In the same way,  many social service systems have introduced changes  that mimic the
private sector  without eliminating public “ownership”.  Countries as diverse as Sweden, France and the
United States have modified social services with measures such as performance budgeting, competition,
and efficiency pricing to reap the rewards of these “market” mechanisms within wholly publicly-owned
and operated systems.
The debates around privatization have also been incomplete because they have not sufficiently addressed
the contextual issues that can make a privately operated system serve the public interest.  It is widely
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agreed that private provision of social services require “regulation”, but the character and content of that
regulation is still poorly understood.  Such regulation would have to address traditional regulatory
questions such as anti-trust enforcement, minimum service or disclosure standards, and limits on adverse
selection in insurance, as well as new areas such as addressing the redistributive impact of a highly
decentralized process.
The debates over decentralization and privatization have created many missteps along the way toward
better health and education systems.  Nevertheless, they have yielded valuable analyses and motivated
several experiments in the region which go beyond these misguided and simplistic levels of discussion.
In these cases, they have made   changes in the dimensions that are really essential to the problem of
social service provision -- the problems of agency and  regulation which will be discussed next.
New Lenses: Theories of the Firm and Agency
Once the diversions created by the debate over decentralization and privatization are set aside, a more
complete framework can be used to analyze and make recommendations regarding improvements in
social service systems.  A useful framework is provided by the extensive literature on Industrial
Organization and its various branches.  As in the comparison of General Motors and Ford, many studies
have illuminated the principles underlying effective forms of organizing public and private firms —
issues related to delegation, transaction costs, and the relative efficiency of hierarchical and horizontal5Consider Oliver Williamson, “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations”, American Economic
Review, 1971; Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: The Free Press, 1985; Michael Jensen and
William Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency, Costs, and Capital Structure, Journal of Financial
Economics, 1976; Masahiko Aoki, The Cooperative Game Theory of the Firm, London: Oxford University Press, 1984.
6For implicit contracts between employers and employees see C. Azariadis, “Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria”,
Journal of Political Economy, 79, 294-313, 1975; for manager-shareholder issues, see R.A. Lambert and D. F. Larcker, “Executive
Compensation, Corporate Decision-Making, and Shareholder Wealth: A Review of the Evidence” Midland Corporate Finance
Journal 2(4), 6-22, 1985.  For a textbook treatment of these issues see Milgrom and Roberts (1992). 
7See, for example, Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Cambridge, MA
and London: The MIT Press, 1993.
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arrangements.  Other studies have focused on how to improve the social outcomes of the interaction
of firms within the market — addressing questions of monopoly power,  information, and regulation.
The organization of firms has evolved significantly from the characterization of firms by a simple
production function, as it is found in neoclassical texts, toward models that view firms as a nexus of
implicit or explicit contracts.  This view does not necessarily supplant the neoclassical model for its main
areas of inquiry related to allocation and market efficiency.  It is, however, essential to investigate
important social and economic questions regarding the size of firms, mobilization of financing, sources
of innovation, and externalities of the workplace, among others.  The literature has analyzed “the firm”
as an institutional arrangement that reduces transaction costs, that establishes a nexus of contracts, that
generates and economizes information, or that results from cooperative “games”.   A common aspect
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of all these models is that they open the “black box” of the firm and analyze behavior of agents within
the firm in relation to one another and the external environment.  A number of particular relationships
have received extensive analysis such as the implicit contracts between employers and employees  and
the potential divergence between the actions of managers and the interests of shareholders.  
6
Another part of the industrial organization literature has focused upon the interaction between firms
and whether this interaction is socially optimal.  The classic problem in this literature is the existence of
natural monopolies, leading to prescriptions for efficient regulation of a single firm.The literature also
demonstrates how the introduction of competition can improve social welfare — either by forcing
potential producers to bid for a franchise (in cases with ever decreasing average costs) or by enforcing
anti-trust provisions to maintain a competitive market (in cases where scale economies are modest
relative to the market).
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Applying the insights from this literature to social services has shown that there are two related ways that
organization affects performance.  The first is related to the theory of the firm and in particular the
concept of agency – how  society delegates functions in its social service systems.  The second is related
to the literature on regulation and is focused on the distributional implications of different forms of
organization along with the policies to address them.
Agency in Social Services
With any kind of division of labor comes the delegation of certain responsibilities.  Economists have
demonstrated that under common conditions, any time one person (denoted the principal) delegates a8Models can also be developed where the information assymetry is generated or compounded by uncertainty.  However, uncertainty
is not sufficient as long as the principal can observe that the agent is fully applying the contracted level of effort.
9For greater discussion of the Principal-Agent Problem see  Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and Spremann (1989). 
10See J.E. Stiglitz, “Credit Markets and the Control of Capital”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 17, 133-52, 1985.
11Consider, for example, Spiller (1990).
12See Ellis and McGuire (1993).
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function to another (denoted the agent) certain problems emerge. 
In its simplest form, the outcome of delegating responsibility to an agent will be inefficient whenever
(i) there is a divergence between the objectives of the principal and the agent, and (ii) the principal and
agent have different information about events (asymmetric information).   Consider the example of a
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principal who wants to hire an agent to produce goods.  The principal’s objective may be to maximize
output, but the agent may want to minimize effort, i.e. a difference in objectives.  If on top of this, the
principal cannot directly observe the agent’s effort in production (i.e. asymmetric information) it
becomes very difficult to know whether output is being maximized or not.   If the principal offers the
9
agent a fixed payment for time spent on the job, the agent has very little incentive to put in any more
effort than is required to avoid being “caught” shirking.  If  at the other extreme, the principal offers
to pay the agent on the basis of output alone, the agent has a large incentive to expand output,  but only
by assuming the risk for conditions outside the agent’s control that may affect output (e.g. material
inputs not arriving on time, weather).  The simple principal-agent problem can be compounded by the
introduction of multiple principals.   In such cases, a particular principal is not only trying to hire an
10
agent, but has to worry about the impact of other principals on the agent’s behavior.  This is an issue
for the government when it hires people to staff its regulatory agencies who can be influenced by the
regulated industry when it implicitly offers  future employment possibilities.   It occurs in the health care
11
sector when doctors are paid by insurers but chosen by patients.   In fact, social service systems are
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highly complex and involve multiple principal-agent relationships: voters and government officials,
political leaders and bureaucrats, Ministries and staff members, managers and doctors, school principals
and teachers, parents and schools, hospitals and medical staff, doctors and patients, to name just a few.
In social service systems, societies have developed a range of structures – with varying degrees of
incentives and accountability – to solve these problems, but difficulties remain.  The most obvious
solution is for the principal to simply order the agent to do exactly what needs to be done.  Although
never fully realized in practice, this approach is implicit in many of the centralized health and education
ministries of Latin America and the Caribbean. However, this option is limited in several ways (as
frequently discovered by many organizations). First, the principal may not have all the information he
or she needs to make proper decisions.  Hence, resources for repairing hospital roofs or distributing
books may not arrive at the right place when they are needed.  Second, the principal may not be able
to observe the agent’s actions.  It is very costly to monitor geographically dispersed agents to be certain
they are complying with the principal’s orders.  Third, the principal may not be able to attribute the
outcomes to the actions of agents.  The resulting test scores of students reflect more than just the effort
of their teachers; a patient’s health is affected by other conditions beyond the intervention of medical
personnel.7
Consequently, any division of responsibilities necessarily involves giving discretion to the agent.  But if
the principal is clever, he or she can organize the system – with incentives and accountability – in ways
that encourage the agent to do things that are more in line with the principal’s own objectives.  
One example is to reward outputs rather than inputs.  By measuring some form of output and linking an
agent’s pay or status to those outputs, it creates an incentive for greater productivity.  The Chilean
education system establishes that public funds will go to schools largely on the basis of student
attendance.  The more students attend, the more resources are allocated.  Consequently, schools have
an incentive to attract and retain students in their programs.  They are held accountable to the degree
that parents pay attention to school test scores and reputation, choosing among schools on the basis
of their perception of performance.  In the health sector, numerous studies demonstrate that doctors
who are paid a fee for each service they perform are much more “productive”, in the sense that they
provide more services than doctors who are on fixed salaries.  Medical providers who receive payments
for the number of clients they serve also have an incentive to seek out new patients – an incentive
scheme that has been used very effectively  to expand health service coverage in Colombia among its
poorer citizens.
The second thing the principal can do is to increase the accountability of the agent.  This requires several
related actions: delegating authority to the agent, generating information about the agent’s outputs (or
activities), and giving oversight to an interested party.  A recent education program in the Brazilian state
of Minas Gerais demonstrates all three of these features.  Primary schools have been given financial
autonomy over their non-payroll budgets.  This means they can allocate resources according to their
knowledge of local conditions and priorities; for example, deciding whether it is more important to paint
the classrooms or buy new maps. Alongside this increased autonomy, the state has also established
standardized examinations that are used to measure school performance against other schools and over
time (adjusted for socioeconomic conditions and other factors).  But it is not sufficient to have the state
education department review these test results and monitor school performance on a daily basis because
it is so costly.  Therefore, the state also established community councils (colegiados) composed of parents,
teachers and community representatives who have the authority to audit school spending, set the local
budget, and deal with some personnel issues. The creation of the  colegiado is  a more efficient solution
to the state’s difficulty in monitoring performance since the community has its own direct interest in
schools that function well.
A very important instrument for increasing accountability is through the use of contests.  Organizations
as different as the Chilean education system, General Motors and the Swedish health system have all
introduced contests of one form or another between different service providing units.  Sometimes these
contests take the more limited form of publishing information about relative performance, in other cases
they involve competition between divisions or service providers to attract clients.  Such contests are
useful because they can help generate information, encourage innovation, and reward good performance.
One of the key advantages of systems with contests between providers  is their capacity to generate
information.Agents who are more autonomous and accountable can justifiably be compared to one
another.  The school or hospital in such a situation can no longer plead ignorance of its budget or of
the kinds and number of services it provides.  Instead, the providers have a direct interest in collecting,
organizing and providing information that demonstrates their worth.  That way, they can argue for
continued support from their constituency. They also have a clearly-defined responsibility to provide8
the services for which they receive their budgets and their salaries.   
Second, greater pluralism means that service providers — managers, teachers, and doctors — can have
both the capacity and interest to innovate and experiment.  Because they have authority to make
decisions and adaptations, they have the capacity to introduce changes that may make their own work
easier or more productive.  Because they are subject to evaluation and comparison to other providers,
the implicit rivalry can generate an interest in learning from groups that have solved similar problems
or discovered more effective methods. By monitoring such variations, public policymakers can also
detect better ways of teaching or improving health and disseminate them.
Third, contests can be particularly effective when used to reward or sanction performance.  Systems that
are fully public, with no consumer choice, can still use contests to highlight which schools or medical
plans have achieved targets or performed  better than their peers.  When such contests are tied to
budget discussions, they can set the stage for negotiating performance improvements and evaluating
managers and teams.
Public systems that include explicit mechanisms for exercising consumer choice, such as the Chilean
education system or the Colombian health plan, make even stronger use of the “rewards and sanctions”
side of contests.  When consumers can choose among providers, feedback regarding performance
comes directly from the registration or exit of students and patients.  The payment mechanism assures
that the ones who attract more clients are rewarded, those who lose clients are penalized.  Furthermore,
this kind of responsiveness encourages dimensions of service quality (such as “service with a smile”) that
are impossible to legislate or monitor bureaucratically.
The advantages of pluralistic systems that include contests are best realized under certain conditions
related to information and collusion.  Information is extremely important to an effective use of contests.
The information upon which contests are judged should be as reliable and as closely linked to desired
outcomes as possible.  When this is achieved, providers’ incentives are more clearly aligned with the
social aims of providing these services.  In the event that consumer choice is involved, consumers need
clear and relevant information.  Sometimes this requires imposing structure on the services provided,
such as limiting the range of health plan options or requiring disclosure of standardized information.
The other factor, collusion among providers, can clearly undermine contests.  Particularly in systems
with choice and limited direct regulation, some kind of anti-trust surveillance  is important to assure that
the social gains from contests are achieved.
The problem of efficient delegation in social services systems is much more fundamental than the
general discussions of privatization or decentralization.  Using agency theory, it is possible  be more
systematic and thorough in evaluating  the alternative ways of better structuring social services.  Such
an approach highlights the critical roles that can be played by improving the linkage between resource
allocation and payments to outputs.   It  suggests the importance of structuring social services to increase
the autonomy of service providers, information about their activities, and oversight by interested parties.
It makes possible a more sophisticated view of competition than is usually developed in the literature
on privatization since contests and competition can be used within the public as well as private spheres.9
Distributional Implications of Organization
Equity is an important consideration in social services.  However, equity has been poorly served by
systems that tend to concentrate resources in richer and urban areas rather than respond to needs and
demand for services independent of income and political clout.  Delegating more responsibilities to
social service providers and introducing pluralism or even competition might be advantageous to higher
income groups and those with greater capacity and access to the political system.  On the other hand,
many of the allocation mechanisms (such as capitation — paying for each student served or for each
citizen affiliated with a health plan) actually do more to equalize the distribution of resources among
citizens than  other more traditional approaches.  In this way, the structure of payments discussed above
can have a very strong egalitarian impact on social services.
Other payment systems can lead to inequalities when consumers are given greater choice and are allowed
to complement public funding with their own resources.  The Chilean health system allows individuals
to choose among private and public health plans, and the better quality private plans serve clients whose
insurance premiums are high enough to cover such services.  Lower income individuals are effectively
excluded.  The recent Colombian health reform addresses this problem by creating a “solidarity fund”.
This fund channels a portion of the obligatory payments from higher income individuals to cross-
subsidize the lower income individuals.  As in the case of contests, any system will be more equitable
to the degree that all potential clients have access to information about different services, the capacity
to evaluate it, and the means to act on their decision.
Problems of adverse selection deserve special attention  in social services because students and patients are
not all the same.  Some cost more to serve than others.  Unless some adjustment is made for these
variations  institutions in more pluralistic systems will either be discouraged from providing services or
they will find ways to discriminate among their clients.  This “adverse selection” can occur when schools
that are under pressure to show high test scores discourage slower learners from applying or when
health insurance plans decide to exclude older clients who are at higher risk of illness.  These difficulties
can be addressed by various means.   In education, additional compensatory funding for disabled
students can overcome the financial disincentive to attract and teach them.  The same can be done for
schools serving lower-income families where adjusting for the risk of higher costs may be important.
In health, pre-establishing groups (such as by geographic area or employer) who choose medical plans
collectively can also diminish the negative impact of adverse selection.  This partly resolves the problem
by pooling  high-risk with low-risk individuals.
Addressing the distributional implications is important regardless whether the system is centralized or
decentralized.  While, the traditional centralized systems are theoretically capable of being redistributive,
in practice the lack of transparency and the political pressures on the systems lead to significant failures.
By contrast, the inequities of resource allocation become readily apparent in systems which give service
providers greater autonomy.  This generates information which can be used in the design of better
allocation rules.  
The rest of this chapter discusses the six case studies in education and health that utilize this  approach.
By comparing education and health systems within the same country, these studies have been able to
isolate the impact of organization on performance from international differences.  They have shown that
schools in Venezuela, Brazil and Chile that had greater autonomy and accountability tended to perform10
better, even after controlling for the socioeconomic background of their students.  The health providers
in the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Uruguay which were more autonomous and faced competition
were also systematically attracting new clients while controlling costs.    In the studies on health,
distributional issues also come to the fore because of the potential for adverse selection and the impact
of flight by higher income groups from the public systems.
Studies in Education
The case studies on education present comparable approaches to measuring the impact of particular
measures  affecting managerial discretion, supervision, accountability, and performance.  In Chile and
Venezuela, the existence of schools which are publicly-funded but managed by non-governmental
institutions made it possible to demonstrate, in some detail, the advantages of greater autonomy for
schools in the allocation of resources, management of their personnel, and accountability to their
sponsors or clients.  In Brazil, a statistical analysis comparing the public school systems of different
states which introduced innovations in school level management, election of school directors, and
parent-teacher councils was able to show the degree to which such changes had an impact on student
test scores, attendance, and repetition.
Although  the studies in this book emphasize and evaluate organizational impact on educational
performance, other studies have addressed the question somewhat indirectly by looking primarily at the
difference between private and public schools.  In the U.S. such questions have been addressed by
Chubb and Moe (1990), Manski (1992), Hanushek (1994), Hoenack (1994), and Hoxby (1996). In Latin
America, numerous studies have found that private schools perform better than public schools even
after controlling for selection and socioeconomic factors, including Valdés (1997), Saavedra (1996), and
Cox and Jimenez (1987).  Recent studies by Van der Gaag (1995) and Zuckerman and de Kadt (1997)
confirm these differences and ask questions related to the sources of the private sector advantages.  In
some of these studies, the emphasis on the private-public distinction has distracted attention to some
degree from the organizational features that can make either private or public schools function better.
The case studies in the education chapters demonstrate how, even within the public sector schools,
incentive structures make a difference.
Chapter 2 compares several kinds of schools in Chile which receive similar amounts of funding but are
organized differently, face different incentives, and vary significantly in terms of student test scores.  The
Chilean system is unique in Latin America because it allocates resources to schools on the basis of the
number of students who attend and it allows non-governmental schools to compete for students and
public funds. Better than any other case, the Chilean education system confounds the traditional
distinction between private and public schooling.  To be sure, some 8.5% of students still attend
traditional privately funded privately run schools. But leaving aside these private schools which finance
themselves exclusively through tuition and serve only higher income groups, Chile has a large and
growing number of schools which are managed privately but which are financed from  taxes.  Therefore
these schools are accessible to students from a wide range of socioeconomic backgrounds.  As a result,
the study is able to confirm that these publicly-funded private schools, operating with similar amounts
of money, have higher test scores than the municipal schools even after controlling for the
socioeconomic background of students and selection effects. 
The advantage in test scores (71% for privately-operated and only 64% for municipal schools) is partly13See O. Larrañaga, “Chile: A Hybrid Approach”, in  Zuckerman and de Kadt, eds. (1997), pp. 19-62.
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a result of more motivated or more capable students seeking the private schools.  But even after
controlling for these factors, a test score advantage remains -- ranging from more than 13 points for
Catholic schools to about 3 points for the private non-religious schools. From interviews with teachers
and director, it appears that better test scores were associated with the greater autonomy and clearer
incentives in the non-municipal schools.  
Directors’ incentives differ because a non-government school is run by its sponsor and its director
within a clear and unforgiving budget constraint.  In fact, a recent study by Larrañaga documents that
the non-government schools operate with less funding on average than the municipal schools.   By
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contrast, municipal schools are run by the municipal government that complements shortfalls with its
own resources.   This soft budget constraint gives the school few rewards for improved performance
and no sanctions for poor performance.
Directors can be extremely important to schools for providing leadership, selecting and managing
personnel, making budget decisions and setting priorities.  Carrying out this role depends in turn upon
their knowledge, scope of action, mechanisms for obtaining resources, and accountability.  Directors
in the municipal schools had very little notion of how much their schools cost to run, whereas the
Directors in the non-governmental schools were informed of the broad outlines of their budget and
collaborate on the preparation of budgets with their superiors.  The degree of autonomy in the non-
governmental schools made it possible for more innovation to occur: changing schedules, teaching
methods, textbooks or content to respond better to their students.  In the non-governmental schools,
directors also have greater scope of action with regard to teachers; they can select, discipline and reward
teachers.  The selection of good teachers was judged to be one of the most important functions and
capacities of a director in these non-governmental schools.  By contrast, directors in municipal schools
had very little input to the selection and management of teachers whose contracts are rigidly influenced
by the national Estatuto de Docentes.
Human resource management differs in other significant ways, as well.   The teachers in the municipal
school system who are covered by the Estatuto de Docentes enjoy strong job guarantees, protecting even
their right to teach in a particular school, and have no links  from pay or stability to performance.  In
interviews, they recognized that the non-government schools do a better job of teaching and attributed
it to better infrastructure, being more demanding on teachers, and the ability to select students.  They
felt that the municipal schools had better benefits, job stability, and were less demanding.  By contrast,
teachers in the non-government schools are ruled by the national labor regime which gives them fewer
job guarantees.  Nonetheless,   the teachers in these schools who were interviewed expressed that they
feel they have job stability --  just that it depends on their performance rather than a union contract.
 
Some of the consequences of these differences are seen in better collaboration between sponsors and
directors in privately-run schools than between public school directors and the municipalities that
oversee them.  Even within the municipal schools, those which are administered directly by the
municipal government (DAEM) do not perform as well as those managed by a public corporation
(Corporaciones).  More innovation is seen in the private schools, which also subsidize in-service training
more than the municipal ones.12
The study recognizes that public schools do have to fulfill obligations from which the private sector is
exempt (including special education and schooling for  more disadvantaged children).   But the
constraints under which the Municipal schools operate in terms of management and budget create
incentive problems; the municipal school is restricted in the ways it can manage its personnel and it faces
soft budget constraints.  By breaking the sample into many categories, not just private versus public but
also between religious and non-religious schools, between DAEMs and Corporaciones, the paper shows
that institutional arrangements make a difference where it counts -- in student learning.
Chapter 3 comes to similar conclusions about the organization of schools in a study that focuses on the
public sector in Brazil.  Using the evidence afforded by state initiatives to implement three kinds of
innovations at different times over the last 10 years, and a data base of test scores which have only
become available since the late 1980s, Barros and Mendonça show systematically that organization can
affect student performance.  Nevertheless, since innovations tend to have been introduced in states with
other positive factors related to family background and teacher quality, it is difficult to attribute the
differences the organizational innovations alone. 
Brazil’s municipalities are formally responsible for primary education; however, in most cases, the
networks of State schools cover more students than do those of the municipalities. With the political
“opening” of the 1980s, people demanded greater avenues for democratic participation and local
involvement in schools.  As a result, many states began to create parent-teacher councils (colegiados) to
govern schools, to allow school directors to be elected by the community, and to give schools greater
financial autonomy.   Although these innovations were originally introduced as ends in themselves – to
increase democratic participation after years of military rule – these innovations were later supported
for their expected impact on school performance.  
Financial autonomy gives the school the power to act on its local knowledge of what is most important
. There is a potential tradeoff between the efficiency gained by using this local information to make a
better allocation of school funds and the loss of scale economies which are possible with central
purchasing and planning.  Nevertheless, the experiments with financial autonomy in Brazil are fairly
limited; spending authority at the school still excludes teachers’ salaries and investments, focusing almost
exclusively on maintenance, teaching materials, and general consumable materials.
The parent-teacher councils create a new forum for monitoring, judging, and holding schools
accountable by a very interested party in the community -- parents.  The role of parents is expected to
support decisions which are focused more on improving school performance, although parents may be
least informed as to the best pedagogical methods, curricula, or teaching materials.   Teachers, on the
other hand, may be better informed but have a vested interest in improving their pay and working
conditions – which can be at odds with the best interest of students or taxpayers.  In cases where
financial resources are transferred to the school, the councils may play a very important role in auditing
school expenditures to minimize misallocation and corruption. 
The election of school directors is also a way of increasing accountability.  In theory, a well-informed
central office might select the best candidates for school principals; however, in practice state-level
politicians treat appointments to the position of director as spoils.  Selection of school directors by
community representatives may be more effective for several reasons.  The community may better
evaluate the local needs and partiular characteristics of cadidates.  The community has a strong direct13
interest in choosing the best candidate.  And, the election of directors insulates these appointments to
some degree from state-level political interference.  To incorporate technical criteria which the
community may not be able to judge, the state of Minas Gerais uses an interesting mixture of these two
mechanisms.  Candidates are put through a series of state examinations and only top three qualified
candidates are placed before the community for discussion and vote. 
Looking at the data as a panel, including 20 states that introduced these innovations at different times
during a 10-year period, confirmed that these innovations may have improved school performance.  On
average, states which transferred financial resources to schools, elected school directors and created
parent-teacher councils had better school attendance, lower repetition rates, fewer delayed students, and
better test scores.  However, the states which adopted these innovations were also, on average, more
likely to have higher incomes and better quality teachers.  After controlling for these observed factors,
and unobserved factors using a fixed-effects model, the results are not as statistically clear. Once these
controls are introduced the election of school directors fails to show a significant impact on student
performance.  However, even after controlling for these other factors, transferring financial resources
and creating parent-teacher councils has a measurable impact on improving school attendance and
reducing the share of students who are behind in their studies.
In Venezuela, schools with greater autonomy, clear budgets, and more flexible contracting arrangements
clearly performed better.  In this case, Chapter 4 describes three kinds of schools — those run by the
national Ministry of Education, by the state of Mérida, and by a religious organization called Fé y Alegría.
The three systems are comparable in the amount of resources that they spend.  Although Fé y Alegría
selects the students who attend their schools, the organization’s commitment to educating children from
poor families means that the students come from similar socioeconomic backgrounds to those in the
state and national schools that were studied.   However, the schools differ in the way they are organized
and managed.  By analyzing these differences, the chapter shows that centralized management, strong
unions, and overspecified contracts are associated with less efficient spending, ineffective supervision,
and lower morale.  For example, the Fé y Alegría schools spend about 12% of their budget on teaching
materials, maintenance, and items other than teachers’ salaries; while the state and national schools spent
5% and 1%, respectively, on these important  non-salary expenditures.  Also, the employment contracts
in the Fé y Alegría schools are only two pages long, leaving the teachers and school directors who
supervise them sufficient room to develop trust and interpret the various obligations and rights in their
particular context.  By contrast, teachers hired in national and state schools have collective contracts
which are extremely detailed and make it very difficult to apply effective personnel management to
specific cases. 
This clear impact of organization on intermediate factors in the operation of schools seems to have had
an impact on student learning as well.  Students in the Fé y Alegría schools performed significantly better
than those in the other schools on reading, writing and mathematics examinations.  Meanwhile, the state
schools, which were less centralized and more flexibly managed than the national schools, performed
better in some areas but not in others.  The authors note that the state schools  had only been operating
for five years, and so the benefits of the alternative form of management may not have fully
materialized, particularly since they performed much better than the national schools in terms of the
intermediate indicators of school quality.
The Venezuelan case holds other important lessons.  Parental involvement was formally introduced into14For a more detailed discussion of setting aside the centralized-decentralized dichotomy and analyzing a variety of functions
within social service systems, see Inter-American Development Bank (1996). 
14
the school system in the 1970s, but had little impact as a consequence of the limited autonomy of the
schools.  Local communities have little incentive to organize, mobilize resources, or debate issues over
which they have no control.  The heavy centralization of the Ministry of Education barred anyone from
effectively voicing their opinions on how the system should operate or improve unless they were
organized nationally.  And in Venezuela, the only national organizations with an interest in the school
system were the teachers unions and the political parties.
The Venezuelan case also shows how perverse the incentives for middle managers can be in a centralized
system.  Since the paychecks for all 300,000 teachers in the system are issued from the central offices
in Caracas, a school director who wants to discount a certain amount from a particular teachers salary
because of absenteeism has to travel to the Ministry’s regional office.  This is so costly for school
directors in distant areas that even the possibility of a financial penalty for absenteeism remains
extremely remote.
The contrast between the Ministry of Education and the Fé y Alegría schools is also instructional.  Both
systems  are “centralized” in that they have well-defined hierarchies, and centralized financing.
Nevertheless, the Fé y Alegría system has clearly divided functions at each level with significant
delegation of functions.  The central offices focus on strategic planning and financing, while regional
offices provide advice and assistance to the schools.  The schools themselves are the basic unit of
management activity.  The school director has to develop a budget, select teachers, provide school
leadership, all with wide discretion.  In  exchange the director is held accountable for acting within the
guidelines provided by the central and regional offices.  In this sense, the differences between the two
systems are not so much a result of being “centralized” or “decentralized” but rather a consequence of
dividing functions efficiently among the different levels and delegating significant responsibilities to the
schools.
14
In all these cases, the student test scores were higher in schools that had greater control over the use
of their budgets, and in which teachers were selected and evaluated on the basis of their performance.
Interestingly, the absence of job guarantees did not result in lower performance or a perception of
greater insecurity.  In the survey, teachers expressed much greater satisfaction in the Fé y Alegría
schools, with the state school and the national schools ranked successively lower.
Studies in Health
The case studies in the health sector also demonstrate the impact of organization on performance.  All
three studies demonstrate the impact of payment mechanisms, consumer choice, adverse selection, and
regulation upon the efficiency, quality, and cost of the different systems.  They show that systems
provide higher quality and more efficient medical care when consumers have greater choice and when
the systems are more competitive.  Prepaid insurance plans that contract with doctors and medical
facilities do a better job of raising utilization rates and satisfying their clients than centralized systems
which maintain doctors on fixed salaries. In each study, the public sectors’ role as a regulator was
criticized as deficient.  In Chile and the Dominican Republic, this critique focused on the absence of15 Consider the literature which could be said to have started with Kenneth Arrow, “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care”, American Economic Review, 53(5), 1963; and has expanded dramatically since the 1970s, including such works
as J. Newhouse, The Economics of Medical Care. Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1978; R. G. Evans, “Incomplete Vertical
Integration: The Distinctive Structure of the Health Care Industry”, in J. van der Gaag and M. Perlman, eds. Health, Economics,
and Health Economics, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1981; A. Enthoven, Theory and Practice of Managed Competition
in Health Care Finance, Lectures in Economics Series, No. 9, New York: Elsevier Science, 1988; and Ellis and McGuire (1993).
16On Chile, see Ernesto Miranda, “Descentralización y privatización del sistema de salud chileno”, Estudios Públicos, No. 39,
Centro de Estudios Públicos, Santiago de Chile, 1991 as well as Chapter 6.  On Colombia, see  Juan Luís Londoño de la Cuesta,
“Managed Competition in the Tropics: Health Reform in Colombia”, Paper presented to the International Health Economics
Association, Vancouver, May, 1996.  On Mexico, see Fundación Mexicana para la Salud, Economía y salud: propuestas para el
avance del sistema de salud en México.  México, 1995.
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quality monitoring and mechanisms to assure financial solidarity; while in Uruguay, the government’s
frequent, erratic, and rigid regulation of the private prepaid systems is an important source of large
inefficiencies in health care. 
The existing literature on health services is quite rich in studies which discuss the impact of organization
on performance, but much of it is theoretical.   The empirical studies have focused on segments of
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health services such as pharmaceuticals, hospital management, and payment mechanisms.  In Latin
America, discussion of health reforms in many countries has generated new studies, beginning with Chile
and more recently on Colombia and Mexico.   The evidence is quite clear that policymakers need to
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think hard about the best ways to structure their health systems if progress is going to be made in
improving and sustaining health conditions.
Chapter 5 studies the Dominican Republic, comparing the Instituto Dominicano de Seguros Sociales (IDSS)
to a growing and diverse group of Igualas that are private prepaid medical insurance plans.  The
differences in organization demonstrate how the absence of incentives linked to performance in the
IDSS system lead to very high costs and poor services compared to the more effective incentive
structure of the Igualas. 
The IDSS is managed centrally, financed by an obligatory 12% payroll tax, and covers a little less than
7% of the population — a group made up of formal sector employees.  Managers from the maximum
authority, the Consejo, down to the directors of hospitals are appointed centrally and are generally
removed with each election cycle. Political criteria dominate in the management of the IDSS over
concerns for health care and efficiency.  Consequently, hospitals are maintained in provinces with too
few potential patients, and utilization rates, at about 50%, are among the lowest in the region.  The short
horizon for political decisions leads to the hiring of new personnel in the face of strikes.  Since the new
personnel cannot be later dismissed, staffing expands excessively.  It has reached some 48 doctors and
55 general nurses per 10,000 affiliates; for comparison, Mexico’s social security system had 8.7 doctors
per 10,000 affiliates in 1993.
Because care is free for everyone affiliated with social security, there is no incentive to seek attention in
primary care centers.  Nor do doctors or managers have any interest in controlling the use of costly
hospital care since higher use provides arguments for more budgets.  As a result, the hospitals are
overburdened with simple consultations – at high cost – which could be more efficiently provided
elsewhere in the system.16
Furthermore, doctors are paid fixed salaries by IDSS, but also maintain private practices.  Since their
IDSS salaries are fixed and guaranteed, the doctors have a clear interest in recommending that patients
see them at their private office – where they  attend to the patients for a fee.  Productivity for doctors,
then, is very low.  In 1994, the average doctor attended only 4 patients per day, and the average dentist
only 1.2.  The effectiveness of these visits is also extremely low.  Each consultation in the IDSS system
required an average of 4.3 additional visits, while in the Public Health Ministry that figure was 0.8 and
in the private sector 0.5.
The poor quality of service perceived by clients is demonstrated by the fact that fewer than one-half of
those who are affiliated actually make use of the IDSS services.  They prefer to pay additional fees to
private doctors or clinics; to pay additional premiums to private insurers; or to consult the Ministry of
Health system rather than the IDSS system. 
The Igualas, which also cover a little more than 7% of the population — also predominantly formal
sector employees — represent a strong contrast to the IDSS.  They are very decentralized and must seek
out paying clients in order to thrive.  The organizational structure of the Igualas varies.  Some negotiate
contracts with a wide range of doctors and medical facilities, while others directly contract their own
doctors and maintain their own facilities.  The most common structure is owned and managed by
doctors, maintains a contract for services with a single hospital, and pays the doctors by a prenegotiated
fee per service.
This combination gives each doctor an incentive to be very productive – the more services provided the
higher their income – yet to remain conscious of costs.    As a result, there are 2,248 initial consultations
per 1,000 affiliates per year in the Igualas compared to only 837 per 1,000 in the IDSS.  However, the
doctors do have an interest in minimizing costs, insofar as they are shareholders and their main purpose
in establishing the Iguala is to channel patients their way.  The average hospital stay is less than 3 days
for the Igualas, while it is 6.8 days in the IDSS.  Costs per consultation are roughly half as much in the
Igualas; and hospital treatments are less than one-third as costly.
Part of the efficiency demonstrated by the Igualas derives from their ability to exclude particularly high
risk patients – such as those over 65 years of age or those infected with HIV.  Most of the costliest
procedures are also excluded from coverage.  Nevertheless, the utilization rates are much higher than
the IDSS; and the fact that they are growing rapidly indicates popular preference for their services.
Adjusting for both these factors, then, confirms the relative efficiency and better quality of health care
provided under the Igualas.
The Igualas, like the IDSS and other health care providers in the Dominican Republic, lack proper
oversight and monitoring.  This makes it possible for some Igualas to deny care – although a bad
reputation can eventually affect their ability to attract and retain clients.  What is most remarkable is the
lack of competition among the Igualas. Contracts are negotiated between personnel managers of firms,
on behalf of the employees, and the Igualas. As a result, the process is not transparent..  There is
evidence that the Igualas have arranged tacit collusion by agreeing not to “raid” clients from their
competitors.
Chapter 6, compares the three main kinds of health service providers in Chile, the Public Health Ministry
and two kinds of private insurers called Institutos de Atencion Prepago deSalud (ISAPREs) .  As a result17 After 1990, Chile has begun to experiment with prospective payments to doctors in municipal health centers based on the number
of users who become affiliated.  To date, there have been no evaluations of that experience.
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of the health reform in the early 1980s, Chileans who pay a  tax of 7% of their wage income were given
the option of having those funds applied to a private health insurance plan or to the public system under
the Fondo Nacional de Salud (FONASA) which acts as a public insurer.  As a result, it is possible to
compare changes in the quality of care and services under different organizational structures and
incentives.  The organizational structure also has implications for global efficiency and equity as a result
of its dualism – in which some have access to ISAPREs and others do not as a function of income and
location.
 The public health system is structured in ways which would be expected to lead to low efficiency.
Doctors and other medical personnel are paid fixed salaries, largely unrelated to their work effort and
performance.   Who gets what services is largely determined by government decisions regarding which
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facilities to expand, staff, and maintain.  The system is financed by taxpayers and users through their
copayments, and it faces competition for its higher income and lower-risk clients from the expanding
ISAPREs.  Although the system suffered a sharp decline in funding during the 1980s, the post-military
governments have increased funding significantly. .  Public sector spending rose from $28 per capita in
1987 to over $60 per capita in 1995 at a time when the number of public sector beneficiaries dropped
by 10%.  Surveys continue to demonstrate that users of public services are less satisfied than those of
the private services.
The ISAPREs are private, generally for-profit, companies that develop and sell health plans to
individuals or groups.  Because all formal sector employees are obligated to contribute 7% of their
salaries into a health plan, the amount of money this contribution represents varies from person to
person according to their income.  For example, a client who earns only $1,000 per month is obligated
to contribute $70 per month, while a client with twice the salary contributes $140 per month.  To attract
both clients while remaining profitable, the ISAPREs have offered a variety of plans with different prices
to accomodate these different contribution levels.  The plans differ in terms of the number of options
available to users as well as the levels of deductibles and copayments.  Some ISAPREs are “closed” in
the sense that they are attached to a particular company and exclusively cover the employees of that
firm.  Others are “open”, that is, anyone can apply and affiliate.  
The ISAPREs have much more sophisticated contracting for physicians and hospital stays than the
public system.  Most of them reimburse health provideres  on the basis of the services provided.
However, some ISAPREs have created integrated plans and are developing cost management through
prospective payments and prenegotiated fees.
The open ISAPREs are subject to much greater competitive pressures than the closed ISAPREs, by the
nature of they way they attract business.  The two kinds of ISAPREs also vary significantly in who
determines the cost and character of the health plans.  These decisions generally emerge from the
process of collective bargaining in the closed ISAPREs – with the firms paying a substantial amount of
money into the health plans over and above the contribution from employees.  On the other hand, the
plans offered by open ISAPREs and chosen by individuals are the outcome of market competition and
pressures since there is little evidence  collusion or oligopoly profits.  In fact, the concentration ratios
for ISAPREs declined over the past decade as more ISAPREs entered the market and enrollments rose.18
There is dramatic evidence to indicate the superior performance of  the open ISAPREs.  The share of
the population affiliated  with ISAPREs rose from under 418,000 in 1985 to more than 3.5 million in
1994.   .  Despite population growth, this increase has even reduced the number of people served by the
public sector which declined from almost 10 million to only 9 million over the same period. The closed
ISAPREs grew about  50% over  this period, with approximately 190,000 affiliates in 1994.  The
expansion of the open ISAPREs has been attained by attracting users with services that are perceived
to be better quality and by expanding the range of plans to attract successively lower income groups.
Over the same time period that the costs per beneficiary in open ISAPREs rose 14%, they rose by over
80% in the closed ISAPREs and 200% in the public sector.  Administrative costs were also driven down
by competition – a 35% decline for the open ISAPRES compared to a 200% increase in the closed
ISAPREs.  The impact of incentives and competition on the cost-efficiency and quality of the open
ISAPREs is strong and positive relative to the other two systems.
At the global level, the country’s health system has developed in a dualistic direction – those who have
sufficient income can purchase their way into the ISAPREs while others are left with only FONASA
as an option.  Therefore, access to particular kinds of care and options are greater for those with higher
incomes.  The structure also ensures that the highest risk population is covered by the public sector
which is the insurer of last resort for many of the costliest procedures.  
The development of the Chilean health system shows that decentralized institutions which must
compete for clients can respond very effectively under a system of obligatory contributions.  The
ISAPREs controlled costs while providing services that attracted large inflows of clients.  They also
generated a variety of service packages to respond to the differing levels of contributions, thereby
allowing them to reach successively lower income groups.  The Chilean system also demonstrates the
importance of considering the global impact of the regulatory scheme with regard to adverse selection,
equity, and the distribution of risk.
Chapter 7 analyzes Uruguay’s Institutos de Asistecia Medica Colectiva (IAMCs) which provide services
to some 50% of the Uruguayan population, and shows that the structureof ownership and payment
mechanisms can have important effects on the efficiency of services.  The IAMCs originated in the 19
th
century as “mutualistas” --  established primarily as self-help associations serving particular occupations
or ethnic groups.  Over time they evolved, with the original occupational or ethnic criteria diminishing
in importance, so that today the mutualistas act as consumer cooperatives for medical services and are
selected by individuals for many different reasons.  Parallel to the mutualistas, other IAMCs owned or
controlled by doctors developed.  These IAMCs are of two varieties: non-union cooperatives and union-
associated cooperatives.  Of the latter, the largest is the Centro de Asistencia del Sindicato de Médicos del
Uruguay (CASMU), operated by the medical union of Montevideo.  These four types of IAMCs –
mutualistas, non-union cooperatives, union-associated cooperatives, and CASMU – represent different
forms of ownership, utilize different payment schemes, and therefore face different incentives as to how
they serve their clients.
In contrast to the Chilean ISAPREs and the Dominican Igualas, the IAMCs are heavily regulated by the
government. The IAMCs are restricted both as to what services they must provide and what prices they
can charge. These regulations leave little room for discretion.  Furthermore, the rapidity and facility with
which the government changes he rules introduces uncertainties that affect their ability to plan.   Since
the early 1980s, regulations have changed regarding:19
C Ceilings on premiums (except for two relatively brief periods in the 1980s and 1990s)
C Restrictions on changing IAMCs (in some periods, liberalized and promoted in others)
C Minimum size (introduced in 1983-1986)
C Directors cannot be paid and technical directors (doctors) have final authority
Other regulations of longer standing which affect the IAMCs include: 
C Requirement that IAMCs provide comprehensive coverage
C “Promoters” cannot be legally hired to advertise and attract new clients
What is notable is that of the various regulations, the ones related to quality of care are very poorly
enforced.  As a consequence, regulations which seek to protect consumers and increase their ability to
select among IAMCs have had the perverse consequence of making it more difficult to judge the
differences among IAMCs.  Since they are unable to openly differentiate their packages and adjust their
prices, the IAMCs necessarily make adjustments in the quality and effective coverage of their services.
These adjustments, however, are not transparent and consumers remain uninformed of the real
differences between plans.
By conducting an econometric analysis of the movement of people into and out of different IAMCs
over time, and taking advantage of the small periods in which prices and copayments were liberalized,
it is possible to see a number of price effects. For example, the experiment with liberalizing copayment
schedules in the 1990s demonstrated strong price responsiveness in Montevideo and much less in the
interior – perhaps an indication of  differences in competitiveness in this period.
The chapter also shows how ownership affects service efficiency by influencing the cost structure.  Since
the law prohibits IAMCs from distributing profits to their owners, the medical cooperatives have higher
shares of salary expenses – maximizing the income going to the owners who are the doctors themselves.
The non-union cooperatives also had the highest share of subcontracted services – reserving more
income from the IAMC for doctors’ salaries.  There was little impact on investment of the different
structures because IAMCs are able to apply to the Ministry of Health for “extra premiums” to cover
authorized investments.  The extra premiums take the investment decision outside the current budget
in which medication and equipment competes for funding against personnel and non-medical services.
As in education, the fixed salaries paid to doctors in many of the IAMCs are associated with lower
output or absenteeism.  However, unlike the case studies in education, this chapter has direct evidence
of  how doctors respond to payments which are directly linked to output, i.e. the number of
consultations or services rendered.  The evidence demonstrates strongly how much more work is done
by doctors who receive some additional compensation from attending patients, than those for whom
work is rewarded by a fixed monthly payment.
Summary
In sum, organization makes a difference.  The delegation of functions, mechanisms for resource
allocation, existence of competition, output measures, and monitoring entities all affect the incentives
faced by service providers and the degree to which they are held accountable for performance. The new
lenses provided by Theories of the Firm are tested in these studies, and demonstrate that addressing20
incentive problems through better organization can improve performance.  By allocating resources on
the basis of outputs rather than inputs, providers receive a net benefit from serving more clients and
reducing unit costs, as shown by the rapid and efficient expansion of health services in the Igualas and
ISAPREs.  Accountability for the services “purchased” in these systems can be improved by delegating
authority to service providers, generating information about their performance, and giving oversight to
an interested party.  The organizational innovations introduced into the State schools of Brazil are clear
examples of increasing accountability in this fashion, with positive results.  The Fé y Alegria schools of
Venezuela also share some of these advantages.  The introduction of contests which encourage efficient
production, generate information, and reinforce the incentive effect of resource allocation mechanisms
can be seen in the Chilean education system -- although the incentives in the Municipal schools are
attenuated by their softer budget constraints.
The new lenses also provide a clearer focus on the distributional implications of different forms of
organization.  Selection problems are clearly apparent in the health systems of Chile and the Dominican
Republic, although the more recent reform in Colombia has found ways to address this issue.  The
Chilean education reform demonstrates how allocating resources on the basis of the number of students
can equalize spending and lay the groundwork for more transparent and effectively targetted
compensatory programs.
By focusing on the organization of health and education systems in Latin America, it should be possible
to accelerate the rate at which educational levels and health conditions are improving.  Such progress
is necessary for the region to meet the challenges of the global economy and to redress the inequitable
distribution of income and opportunities within the region.  These studies and future ones can form the
empirical foundation for this endeavor, by identifying the policies that will significantly change incentives
and accountability with the goal of improving the access, quality and efficiency of health and education.21
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